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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

What specific issues were reversed and remanded by the Utah Court of
Appeals from its decision in Anderson II and were Respondent's appellate
attorney fees included in the reversal and remand decision from the Utah
Court of Appeals?
7,8
3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court properly complied, on remand, with the Utah Court
of appeals decision in Anderson II is a question of law the court must
review for correctness. Amax Magnesium Corp. V. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840.842 (Utah 1994).
2.

Did the trial court understand the breadth and scope of the remand issue
directives from the Court of Appeals in Anderson II?
8,9, 10
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court properly complied, on remand, with the Utah Court
of appeals decision in Anderson II is a question of law the court must review
for correctness. Amax Magnesium Corp. V. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 874
P.2d 840,842 (Utah 1994).

3.

There is caselaw handed down from the Utah Court of Appeals giving
specific directives regarding when trial courts may consider awarding
appellate attorney fees- did the trial court in Anderson II adhere to those
directives?
10,11,12, 13
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court properly complied, on remand, with the Utah Court
of appeals decision in Anderson II is a question of law the court must
review for correctness. Amax Magnesium Corp. V. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840,842 (Utah 1994).

4.

If the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's decision regarding
Respondent's appellate attorney fees as reguested in this appeal, should
Petitioner be entitled to consideration of her appellate attorney fees for this
appeal?
13, 14
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The trial court committed error by awarding Appellee his attorney fees on appeal
when the Utah Court of Appeals had not specifically remanded that issue to the trial court.
In a Memorandum Decision issued by the Utah Court of Appeals in this same matter, Case
#20070514 (Addendum #3), the Utah Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court
4

specific issues. The Court of Appeals directed that the trial court enter an order in
accordance with the Court of Appeals directives which essentially reversed the initial trial
court decision. The trial court awarded appellate attorney fees to the Respondent in the
hearing on remand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF THE CASE
A Decree of Divorce was signed in this case on April 20, 1999 (Record @ 46-54).
Approximately six years later, Petitioner filed for a Modification of the Decree of Divorce
(Record @ 59-61). On October 26, 2006 the case came on for trial. The trial court found
Respondent to be in contempt of court for numerous violations of the Decree of Divorce
and a judgment was entered against Respondent in the amount of $44,311.00. The trial
court also awarded Petitioner attorney fees and costs and ordered Respondent to pay
Petitioner $7,652.97 for her attorney fees and costs (Record @ 216-221).
Respondent appealed the trial court ruling (Record @ 222-223) resulting in
Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App3, 176 P.3d 464 (Anderson I, Addendum #4). The
Utah Court of Appeals upheld the rulings of the trial court with the exception of the attorney
fee award which was remanded to the trial court with specific directives that if the trial court
determined that it could enter sufficient findings to support an attorney fee award, the trial
court could enter an order of attorney fees. More importantly, the Court of Appeals gave
the trial court specific additional directives regarding considerations the trial court could
make concerning the determination of Petitioner's appeal attorney fees also to be
examined by the trial court on remand.
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After the October, 2006 trial, subsequent Order to Show Cause documents were
filed by both sides (Record @ 233-274). In yet another hearing Respondent was found to
be contempt of court for violation of a different court order than the contempts of court
originally decided in the October, 2006 trial. The court awarded Petitioner her attorney
fees and court costs dealing with this subsequent contempt of court by Respondent.
Respondent filed a second appeal, Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 170A
(Anderson II) (Record @ 555-560 and Addendum #3). In this second appeal the Utah
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's finding of contempt against the
Respondent stating that, "we remain unconvinced that there is clear and convincing proof
that Husband knew what was required here, let alone that he willfully and knowingly
refused to comply."
In Anderson II, because the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the
central issue regarding Respondent's contempt, the court also reversed the trial court's
award of attorney fees and costs to Petitioner. Also in Anderson II, the Court of Appeals
gave specific directives to the trial court in its remand on the issue of Respondent's
attorney fees stating that, "we remand to the district court to determine if an award of costs
and attorney fees should be awarded to husband and, if so, to determine the amount."
There was absolutely no directive by the Court of Appeals in Anderson II for the trial
court on remand to address the issue of whether or not Respondent was entitled to his
appeal attorney fees. On remand, the trial court awarded Respondent his attorney fees
and costs and also awarded Respondent his attorney fees incurred from the appeal in
Anderson II.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in its decision to award Respondent his appellate attorney
fees and costs from the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded decision in
Anderson II. The Utah Court of Appeals did not specifically direct the district trial court that
it could entertain this specific issue. If an appellate court does not give instructions to a
district trial court to decide appellate attorney fees, that lack of instruction is tanamount to a
denial of Respondent's request for appellate attorney fees.
The only time a district trial court has the discretion to make a determination as to
appellate attorney fees is when the appellate court decides and informs the district trial
court that it may entertain that issue.
Since the district court lacked authority to make this decision, the award of the
district trial court to allow $7,463.04 in appeal attorney fees to Respondent in Anderson II
should be reversed. Further, Petitioner should be awarded her attorney fees and court
costs for the need to file this appeal due to the error of the district court.
ARGUMENT: POINT ONE
WHAT SPECIFIC ISSUES WERE REVERSED AND REMANDED BY THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS FROM ITS DECISION IN ANDERSON II AND WERE
RESPONDENTS APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES INCLUDED IN THE REVERSAL AND
REMAND DECISION FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS?
The Utah Court of Appeals set forth its decision in Anderson II on May 15, 2008
(Addendum #3 and Record @ 536-540). Respondent prevailed in Anderson II and the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court decision regarding its finding of

7

contempt on the part of Respondent. The Court of Appeals specifically entered the
following:
1. remand to the district court for entry of findings on whether Wife should have
been ordered to refund child support overpayment;
2. reversal on the issue of contempt against the Respondent;
3. reversal on the award of attorney fees and costs to Wife, which award was
based on the holding of contempt;
4. there is no basis to grant Wife's request for an award of attorney fees and
costs for the appeal;
5. remand to the district court to determine if an award of costs and attorney
fees should be awarded to Husband and, if so, to determine the amount.
In other words the Utah Court of Appeals in Anderson II reversed two issues and
remanded two issues. These were the exact directives from the Court of Appeals to the
trial court.
Could there be any confusion whatsoever of what exactly was reversed and
remanded. Could the trial court not have understood or misinterpreted exactly what its
duties were in the remand process including whether Respondent's appellate attorney fees
were to be addressed or included in its decision.
Absolutely nowhere in the specific reversal and remand directives of the Utah Court
of Appeals does the appeal court give the district trial court permission to address the
appellate attorney fees issue.
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ARGUMENT: POINT TWO
DID THE TRIAL COURT UNDERSTAND THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE
REMAND DIRECTIVES FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ANDERSON II?
Because the trial court lumped all of Respondent's attorney fees into one large
figure as requested by Respondent, that being $11,365.54, is it possible that the trial court
did not understand what was required in the remand directives from the Court of Appeals in
its Anderson II remand.
In the hearing held on June 17,2009 before Judge Henriod (Record @ 417, page 5
line 16) evidence was taken which insured that the trial court was aware of the specific
several remanded issues and that the Anderson II remand did not direct the trial court to
consider appellate attorney fees and costs for Respondent:
Mr. Friel:... if we give respondent his attorney fees, this is not appeal
fees, but his attorney fees, they should be $3,902.50. The dispute is their
interpretation or their position is that since they prevailed with the order to
show cause, and since Your Honor ordered, gave them attorney fees, that
since they prevailed on appeal they should also get those fees. And our
- the Court of Appeals did not specifically address that, which was - which
was exact opposite of appeal number one. And our position was that
Your Honor, after receiving evidence at the February hearing and in your
minute entry ruling, found not only that we should be awarded the
reasonable attorney fees because of the needs-based analysis that Your
Honor did, but Your Honor then specifically awarded our attorney fees for
the appeal.
And the difference was the Court of Appeals gave this Court
direction to do that. So in appeal one it said, we remand, or under appeal
one was only remanded for attorney fees. Everything else stood on the
contempts and all others. And then it said with the Judge Kouris ruling,
since he didn't do the needs-based and reasonableness, it was
remanded. So then the Court of Appeals gave this Court direction and
said, if the court finds that there was need and does that analysis, then it
can enter the attorney fees and specifically the court said, and the court
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can then address the attorney fees for appeal number one. And so
they're not disputing that.
And the only reason I bring it up is in appeal number two and that
page number 5 specifically then, Your Honor, I'm looking at Line 3 again,
backing up just a little bit, it's says, likewise, there is no basis to grant wife's
request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. Husband
argues that with a reversal he should be awarded his attorney fees and
costs below," and we're not going to dispute that. But it doesn't say
anything about his attorney fees for appeal two.
And they're saying in the affidavit Mr. Richards provided in February,
had a total of the pre-appeal fees of $3,900 - $3,902.50 and then had his
appeal two fees in addition which I don't think, well, don't think - the court
didn't say that they would be entitled to that...
... (going to Record @417, page 9, line 16)
MR. FRIEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I've tracked with Mr. Richards'
calculations and I think we are together. The issue is did Your Honor
mean in the minute entry to include all of his fees, which I don't think was,
well, it was not set forth by the Court of Appeals, or was it just up to the
time of the filing of the appeal?
THE COURT: The answer is, I meant to include all of his fees exactly
the way he put the order together.
Therefore, on its own accord, in the remand hearing the trial court lumped
Respondent's attorney fees and costs incurred up to the time of the appeal totaling
$3,902.50 along with adding Respondent's appeal two attorney's fees of $7,463.04 which
totals the $11,365.54 entered in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
paragraph 24, (Record @ 818) and Order Regarding Fees and Costs on Remand,
paragraph 2 (Record @ 821). It is Petitioner's position that the $7,463.04 which were all of
Respondent's appellate fees awarded by the trial court, should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT: POINT THREE
THERE IS CASELAW HANDED DOWN FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GIVING SPECIFIC DIRECTIVES REGARDING WHEN TRIAL COURTS MAY CONSIDER
AWARDING APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES- DID THE TRIAL COURT IN ANDERSON II
ADHERE TO THOSE DIRECTIVES?
In the case of Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(Slattery II) the Utah court of Appeals dealt directly head on with the exact same issues that
Petitioner is asking the Court to consider in the case at hand. In Slattery II, the Utah Court
of Appeals found that the trial court had exceeded its authority on remand by awarding
Slattery judgment for attorney fees incurred by her in Slattery I. The Court went on to say
that its decision in Slattery I specifically declined to consider Slattery's request for attorney
fees on appeal (See Slattery I, 857 P.2d at 249 n.4).
The issue identified in Slattery II is identical to this appeal as the Court examines its
reversal and remand directives from Anderson II. The last sentence of the remand
decision from Anderson II states, "Accordingly, we remand to the district court to determine
if an award of costs and attorney fees should be awarded to Husband and, if so, to
determine the amount" (Record @ 536).
Earlier, in the same paragraph the Court of Appeals states, "Husband argues that
with a reversal, he should be awarded his attorney fees and court costs below". On
remand the Court of Appeals did allow the district court to consider Respondent's attorney
fees and court costs and Petitioner is not challenging that ruling. However, the issue
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remains: did the Court of Appeals in Anderson II authorize or direct the trial court to
examine Respondent's appellate attorney fees in its decision.
Respondent might argue that since the Court of Appeals was silent on this issue the
trial court could infer or take liberties in its decision to award the $7,463.04 to Respondent
for his appellate attorney fees incurred in Anderson II. This is the exact argument used in
Slattery II. Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals went on to say in Slattery II that, "Our
refusal to consider Slattery's request for attorney fees is tanamount to a denial of that
request, thus resolving that issue against Slattery. A trial court cannot consider the issue
of entitlement to appellate attorney fees on its own initiative because this decision is the
sole prerogative of the appellate court." TS 1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156,160 n. 2
(Utah Ape. 1994); Yorke Management v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 546 N.E.2d 342,344(1989);
Vinton Eppsco, Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 226,' 638 P.2d
1070, 1071 (1981); Schere v. Z.F., Inc., 578 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1991).
The Utah Court of Appeals ended its decision in Slattery II by stating on the issue of
appellate attorney fees that, "the only time a trial court has any discretion in the matter of
appellate attorney fees is when an appellate court determines that appellate attorney fees
are warranted, but remands the issue to the trial court for a determination of the amount to
be awarded. Vinton Eppsco, 638 p.2d at 1071.
Interestingly enough, when the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
trial court's initial decision to award Petitioner her attorney fees and court costs, the Court
of Appeals in Anderson I did specifically give the trial court remand directives that it could
consider entering findings to support a decision for Petitioner to receive her appellate
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attorney fees. However, the Court of Appeals gave no such directives to the trial court in
Anderson II regarding consideration of Respondent's appellate attorney fees and costs.
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed its decision on appellate attorney fees
from Slattery in its decision in 2005 in the case of Cache County v. Beus, 128 P.3d 63, 539
Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 2005 UT App 503. In Cache County the Utah Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the trial court's decision to award Cache County its attorney fees
and court costs from inception of the case. In its reversal and remand the Court of Appeals
followed the rationale it had developed in Slattery by stating, "The trial court had no
discretion to award Cache County attorney fees it had incurred on appeal in Cache County
I". The Court of Appeals went on to restate in Cache County II the exact same caselaw it
had carved out in Slattery II regarding appellate attorney fees.
POINT FOUR
IF THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
REGARDING APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES AS REQUESTED IN THIS APPEAL.
SHOULD PETITIONER BE ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION OF HER APPELLATE
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THIS APPEAL?
It possible for the Utah Court of Appeals to consider awarding Petitioner her appeal
attorney fees for this appeal. If Petitioner is successful on this appeal, Respondent would
still have substantially prevailed in Anderson II. As the Utah Court of Appeals has recently
pointed out, "there can be only one prevailing party in any litigation" (Chang v. Soldier
Summit Dev.; 2003 UT App 415, 82 P.3d 203).
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On remand, the trial court followed the directives of the Utah Court of Appeals by its
consideration of Respondent's costs and attorney fees. The trial court entered an award of
attorney fees and costs in favor or Respondent for litigation expenses incurred up to the
filing of appeal number two and it is Petitioner's position that the trial court also entered an
order granting Respondent his appellate attorney fees from Anderson II, which was
incorrect.
As an equity or fairness issue, is it proper that Petitioner must expend a good
portion of funds she is seeking back from Respondent based upon the trial court not
properly following the remand directives of the Utah Court of Appeals. Or is this deemed
as the cost of litigation and doing business?
If the Court grants Petitioner the relief she is seeking in this third appeal between the
parties, this means that Petitioner will have prevailed in two of the three appeal cases.
Respondent filed Anderson I and Petitioner prevailed. Respondent filed Anderson II and
Respondent prevailed. Yet, Petitioner will have received appellate attorney fees in
Anderson I only.
If this matter is reversed as Petitioner is requesting, there will be additional attorney
fees needed and required for Petitioner to successfully finish what was a trial court error.
Petitioner seeks an award of her attorney fees for the fees and costs necessary for this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
The reversal and remand directives from the Utah Court of Appeals in Anderson II
are clear. Specific instruction was not given by the Utah Court of Appeals to the district
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trial court for the trial court to consider awarding Respondent his appellate attorney fees
and costs in Anderson II. Without that directive from the Utah Court of Appeals, the district
trial court had no authority to issue an order granting Respondent $7,463.01 in appellate
attorney fees from Anderson II. Therefore, the Findings and Order of the trial court must be
reversed and Petitioner should be awarded attorney fees for this appeal.
DATED THIS

J

day of

AflUL<<

, 2010.

David J Friel

I

Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document on this

day of

A?tM*s

2010 by United States mail, first class,

postage pre-paid, to:
Bruce L. Richards, Esquire
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, UT 84125
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ADDENDUM

#1
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES

BRUCE L. RICHARDS (2737)
DEAN A. STUART (7640)
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Respondent
1805 South Redwood Road
P.O. Box 25786
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786
Telephone: (801) 972-0307
Facsimile: (801) 972-0387
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FILED

BY^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA ANDERSON,
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson)

)>
)>
)
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES

v.

])

Civil No. 994300102DA

GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,

;)

Judge: Henriod

Petitioner,

Respondent.

'

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on remand from the Utah Court of
Appeals for an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees on February 9, 2009. The issues
before the Court were attorney's fees for the Petitioner's claim for fees after the Decision on
appeal January 4, 2008, in favor of the Petitioner; and after the Decision on Appeal, May 15,
2008, in favor of the Respondent. David Friel appeared on behalf of the Petitioner. Bruce L.
Richards appeared on behalf of the Respondent. The Court heard testimony, received exhibits
and has entered a Minute Entry indicating the Court's Ruling. Subsequent oral argument was
heard on June 17, 2009 on Petitioner's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law Regarding Attorneys Fees.

r r\ a ^ <

Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, the court hereby makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner has gross monthly income of $728.00 plus $2,061.00 in monthly child

support, plus an annual child support payment earmarked for Christmas and birthday gifts in an
amount of $2,200.00.
2.

Petitioner's income has been static for the past eight years.

3.

She works approximately 25 hours per week in a daycare facility.

4.

She previously cut and colored women's hair in a salon in her home, but does that

only once or twice a year at the present time.
5.

She has remarried as of 2004, has an additional child, and her spouse earns $13.50

per hour working full time.
6.

Petitioner testified that she can't afford her attorney's fees and needs help.

7.

The total family income at the present time is approximately $3,138.00 per month

8.

Petitioner's family has a marital home, two vehicles which are paid for, and

gross.

claims total monthly expenses of $4,982.00, with expenses exceeding income in a relatively
small amount.
9.

Attorney's fees were not included in said monthly expenses.

10.

The parties stipulated that Respondent has the ability to pay.

11.

Petitioner's counsel bills his time at $200.00 per hour and bills his office staff at

$40.00 per hour.
12.

Petitioner billed, without adjustments, $9,605.20 for the first appeal.

2

r.noi oi

13.

The Petitioner's hourly rate is toward the top end of hourly rates for domestic

work in Tooele County, but is not unreasonable.
14.

Billing out office staff time at $40.00 per hour is neither reasonable nor ethical.

15.

Office staff is not paid the $40.00 per hour unless the client pays, so Petitioner's

counsel has exactly the same interest in the firm's accounts receivable as Petitioner's counsel
has.
16.

A review of the time spent on the appeal does not indicate that increments of time

expended on specific aspects of the appeal were unreasonable.
17.

Respondent clearly prevailed on the second appeal.

18.

The attorney's fees and costs expended on the second Order to Show Cause and

second appeal are reasonable as to the hourly rate and the time increments for the tasks
performed and were necessary.
19.

The parties stipulated that $512.00 could be subtracted from Petitioner's

Attorneys Fees due to a suspension of Petitioner's Counsel's license.
20.

An adjustment of $ 136.00 is subtracted for charges related to the second appeal.

21.

An adjustment of $239.20 is subtracted for charges for secretarial services.

22.

The total of the three adjustments is $888.00. The net amount of fees and costs to

be awarded to Petitioner is $8,717.20 for attorneys' fees in appeal #1 solely. The Court also
upheld the attorneys fees awarded at trial in the amount of $7,652.97.
23.

The amount of fees and costs for the Respondent's counsel through June 30, 2008

totals $11,365.54, which includes attorneys' fees for Appeal #2.
24.

The total amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Respondent is $11,365.54.

These fees and costs are found to be reasonable and necessary.

3
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25.

Respondent owes Petitioner a net amount of $ 1,899.74 plus interest on the

underlying amount after considering the amounts awarded to Petitioner and to Respondent and
the payments already made to Petitioner totaling $47,416.73.
26.

The Court has on deposit from the supersedeas bonds and cost bonds posted by

Respondent, a total of $16,300.00.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

On the first remand, the District Court was directed to consider the standard

criteria for award of fees: (1) requesting party in need of assistance; (2) the reasonableness; and
(3) responding party's ability to pay.
2.

Petitioner should be awarded fees in the amount of $8,717.20 for Appeal #1 plus

the attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court of $7,652.97, plus interest.
3.

On the second appeal, Respondent appealed the Court's Order holding him in

contempt. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded specifically stating:
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2), provides that, "in any
action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the Court may award costs and
attorneys fees upon determining that the parties
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
Accordingly, we remand to the District Court to
determine if an award of costs and attorneys fees
should be awarded the husband and, if so, to
determine the amount.
4.

Respondent clearly prevailed on the second appeal.

5.

Since the Appeals Court relied on the enforcement provisions of the statute, it

does not appear that the District Court needs to use the same analysis as used on the first remand,
that of need and ability to pay, but should consider reasonableness.
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6.

The fees and costs expended on behalf of the Respondent were necessary and

reasonable.
7.

Petitioner should be awarded fees in the amount of $8,717.20 plus the attorneys'

fees awarded by the Trial Court of $7,652.97, plus interest.
8.

Respondent should be awarded fees in the amount of $ 11,265.54.

9.

The net amount owed by Respondent to Petitioner is $1,899.74 plus interest on

the underlying amount.
10.

The amounts held by the Court as supersedeas or cost bonds totaling $16,300.00

should be distributed with Petitioner receiving $1,899.74 plus interest and the Respondent
receiving the balance.
11.

An Order incorporating the terms of these Findings and Conclusions should be

entered.
DATED this }A day of September, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRIOD

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David Friel
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA ANDERSON,
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson)

;)
)I

ORDER REGARDING FEES AND
COSTS ON REMAND

v.

])

Civil No. 994300102DA

GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON,

;)

Judge: Henriod

Petitioner,

Respondent.

]

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on remand of two appeals from the Utah
Court of Appeals. An evidentiary hearing was conducted by the Court on February 2, 2009. The
Court entered its ruling in a Minute Entry entered March 20, 2009. The Court heard oral
argument on the Petitioner's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Regarding Attorneys Fees on June 17, 2009. The Court has entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Petitioner is awarded attorney's fees and costs related to the first appeal in the

amount of $8,717.20 plus the attorneys fees awarded at trial in the amount of $7,652.97.

n nQo o

2.

Respondent is awarded attorney's fees and costs with respect to the second Order

to Show Cause and appeal in the amount of $11,365.54.
3.

The net amount owed by Respondent to Petitioner is $1,899.74 plus interest on

the underlying amounts.
4.

The amounts held by the Court as supersedeas or cost bonds totaling $16,300.00

shall be distributed by the Clerk of the Court with Petitioner receiving $1,899.74 plus interest
and the Respondent receiving the balance.
DATED this J ^ d a y of September, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRlOD

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David Friel
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Third District, Tooele Department, 994300102
The Honorable Mark S. Kouris
Attorneys:

Bruce L. Richards and Dean A. Stuart, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
David J. Friel, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Davis.
DAVIS, Judge:
Glenn Hunter Thompson (Husband) appeals from the district
court's order holding him in contempt. He also appeals the
district court's determination in that same order that Linda
Anderson fka Linda LaRee Thompson (Wife) need not refund him a
child support overpayment. Husband further argues that because
of these errors, the district court improperly awarded Wife
attorney fees and costs, and should have instead awarded attorney
fees and costs to him. We reverse and remand.
Husband primarily challenges the contempt ruling. "The
decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless the trial court's action 'is so unreasonable as to
be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, f 8, 973 P.2d 988
(quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah
1976)). "'To find contempt [in a civil case], the [district]
court must find from clear and convincing proof that the
contemnor knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.'" Id. \ 10

r*>

(quoting Kunzler v. 0 ! Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App.
1993)) .
Here, the first action causing the district court to hold
Husband in contempt was Husband's holding of a family meeting in
which he told the children to forgive Wife and made statements
that because of Wife he could no longer give them a big Christmas
or take them on trips and vacations. The actions causing the
court to hold Husband in contempt the second time were his
knowing that his new wife made the notation "B" on the memo area
of two support checks and his delivery of one of these checks to
the parties' oldest child for him to give to Wife. The district
court determined that such actions violated a provision of the
parties' divorce decree, which stated that "[t]he parties shall
work together to resolve issues involving the children."2 The
court made the specific finding that "[Husband] was aware of the

1. Wife argues that we should not reach Husband's argument
regarding contempt because he has failed to marshal the evidence
as required by Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, %% 76-80, 100 P.3d
1177. Although often referred to as a "finding" of contempt, the
contempt determination here is not a true factual finding that
would require a party challenging it to marshal the evidence.
Rather, this is a legal conclusion that must be supported by
factual findings. We do not see that Husband is challenging any
of the findings of the district court regarding his actions or
his awareness of the divorce decree; he instead challenges the
legal conclusion that his actions and knowledge allowed the court
to exercise its discretion and hold him in contempt.
Wife also argues that because Husband sets forth the
incorrect standard of review, his challenges must fail. Wife
provides no support for this reasoning, and we know of no rule to
this effect. Although in his initial statement of the issues
Husband provides the burden of proof for contempt as opposed to
the standard of review, this appears to result from the fact that
his primary contention is that the standard of proof was not met
and, thus, the district court had no discretion to exercise in
this matter. Further, Husband quotes both the appropriate
standard of review and the related standard of proof in the
analysis portion of his brief.
2. The district court also held Husband in contempt based on the
court's understanding that in an earlier proceeding it had
instructed that the children not "be involved." Such
instruction, however, was never memorialized in the corresponding
written order. Further, neither party addressed this instruction
at oral argument, neither party provided a record citation for
the instruction, and we see no such instruction in our cursory
review of the court's ruling from the bench. Thus, we do not
address this oral instruction allegedly given from the bench.
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[d]ecree and certainly had the capacity to follow the decree."3
However, the issue is not whether Husband was aware of the
divorce decree but whether he knew that his actions were
prohibited by the divorce decree. We determine that the language
of the divorce decree does not establish the basis for clear and
convincing proof that Husband knew what was required, i.e., that
he knew his actions relating to the family meeting and the
support checks were in violation of the divorce decree.
The paragraph of the divorce decree relied upon by the
district court states, in its entirety:
That the parties are both fit and proper
persons to be awarded the care, custody and
control of the minor children and therefore
the parties should be awarded joint legal
custody with [Wife] being granted primary
physical custody. The parties shall work
together to resolve issues involving the
children, however [Wife] as custodial parent
shall make the final decision.
When reading the entire provision containing the "work together"
phrase, it appears that the term references making decisions
regarding the children. Wife argues that this sentence should be
read to prevent the parties from "working against each other."
But the "work together" phrase, sandwiched between phrases
clearly addressing custody arrangements and referencing decisions
involving the children, does not prohibit any and all actions on
the part of Husband that would be less than friendly. Although
Husband's actions may have been, as the district court found,
"deplorable," "upset[ting] ," and "appall [ing] ," such does not
alone meet the standard of proof required to hold a person in
contempt. As inappropriate as the actions may be, the simple
fact that one party behaves in a petty or childish manner is not
sufficient to justify holding that party in contempt for
violating the general direction to work with the other party
regarding the children. Indeed, " [for] a court order to be the
basis of a finding of guilty of contempt for disobedience
thereof [, it] must be clear and unambiguous." Foreman v.
Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144, 156 (1946) (Wolfe, J.,
concurring). Thus, when it is not clear as to what the language
of the order references, "the order [is] not sufficiently clear
on that point to support the finding of guilty of contempt for
disobedience of that element of the order or to base a judgment
for damages for disobedience of that element of the order." See
id.

3. The district court determined that Husband could have
followed the decree by taking the blame for his challenging
financial situation, even suggesting that Husband should have
told the children less than truthful reasons for the money
shortage.

20070514-CA

3
n

r\

r~ *~" f-H

Wife points to the fact that this court recently upheld
other holdings of contempt in prior proceedings of this case, see
Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, 176 P.3d 464. Husband's
actions at that time, however, highlight the issue here. Husband
was previously held in contempt for his failure to pay child
support, a portion of the children's activity costs, and spousal
support. See id. ^ 19-20. Each of these responsibilities was
specifically set forth in the divorce decree. See id. Husband
was also held in contempt for his failure to provide, as
previously stipulated, the tax documents from which the decreeordered support would be calculated. See id. f 18. Husband's
obligations on these matters are set forth in clear language in
the divorce decree and are not derived from the general statement
that the parties must work together on issues involving the
children. Thus, we remain unconvinced that there is clear and
convincing proof that Husband knew what was required here, let
alone that he willfully and knowingly refused to comply.
Husband next argues that Wife should have been ordered to
refund his child support overpayment for January 2 007.4 Having
determined that Husband overpaid, the court's entire reference to
this issue is the following: "Regarding the issue of refunding
$455.08 from [Wife] to [Husband] concerning the difference in the
January child support payment is ruled in favor of [Wife].
Therefore, [Wife] has no need to refund those monies." Without
findings supporting this ruling, we cannot determine the basis
for the denial of the refund. Indeed, in response to Husband's
argument, Wife only speculates that this denial was "probably"
because Husband was held in contempt and because monies were
still owing to Wife. Adequate findings of fact " 'show that the
court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is
4. Wife argues that we should not consider this issue, asserting
that Husband failed to "properly raise[]" the issue because he
did not include it among those issues listed in his "Statement of
Issues" section. We agree that rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requires that this issue be included among
the initial listing of issues in Husband's brief. See Utah R.
App. P. 24(a) (5) . And we recognize that we may disregard or
strike briefs that do not comply with the requirements of rule
24. See id. R. 24 (k) . "However, we are not obligated to strike
or disregard a marginal or inadequate brief," State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, 1[ 8, 1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis added), and we usually
reserve such a harsh sanction for cases where the noncompliance
with rule 24 is much more egregious than that here, see, e.g.,
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998) (disregarding
issues raised in a brief that "fail[ed] to comply with almost
every requirement set forth in rule 24") . Here, where the
failure to comply with the requirements of rule 24 was fairly
minor, where the argument was presented with sufficient clarity
in the analysis portion of the brief, and where the noncompliance
does not frustrate the purposes behind rule 24, see id, at 94 9,
we decline to exercise our discretion to impose a sanction under
rule 24 .
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supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.1" Armed Forces Ins. Exch, v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14,
H 28, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987)) .
If the findings of fact in a case are
incomplete, the court may order the trial
court . . . to supplement, modify, or
complete the findings to make them conform to
the issues presented and the facts as found
from the evidence and may direct the trial
court . . . to enter judgment in accordance
with the findings as revised.
Utah R. App. P. 30(a). We therefore remand to the district court
for entry of findings on this issue and an entry of an order in
accordance with those findings.
Because we reverse on the issue of contempt, we reverse the
award of attorney fees and costs to Wife, which award was based
on the holding of contempt. Likewise, there is no basis to grant
Wife's request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Husband argues that with a reversal, he should be awarded his
attorney fees and costs below. Utah Code section 30-3-3(2)
provides that "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody,
parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim
or defense.1' Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (2007). Accordingly, we
remand to the district court to determine if an award of
costs
and attorney fees should be awarded to Husband and, if so, to
determine the amount.

WE CONCUR:

I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of
Appeals, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a
full, true and correct copy of an original document
on file in the Utah Court of Appeals. In testimony
whereof, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of

fc^^^tjsa

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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McHUGH, Judge:
fl
Respondent Glenn Thompson (Husband) appeals from the trial
court's order, which awarded Petitioner Linda Anderson (Wife) a
judgment, found Husband in contempt of court for violating the
parties1 Decree of Divorce, and awarded attorney fees to Wife.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the entry of
more detailed findings of fact regarding the award of attorney
fees.
BACKGROUND
f2
Husband and Wife married on June 12, 1987, and divorced on
April 20, 1999. Four children were born during the course of the
marriage. Paragraph nine of the parties' Decree of Divorce (the
Decree) stated that " [u]pon the termination of alimony . . . .
[Husband's] monthly child support obligation shall be
automatically increased each year by .7% (.007) of [Husband's]
gross business receipts . . . in order to preserve the ratio of
monthly child support to [Husband's] yearly gross business
receipts." Paragraph ten of the Decree required Husband to make
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several payments to Wife "for the benefit of the children in
addition to child support," including money for Christmas and all
costs for "non-school extra-curricular activities and lessons."
Paragraph twenty of the Decree required Husband to pay Wife "a
reasonable annual 'cost of living' increase in alimony."
%3
The parties also entered into a verbal agreement to resolve
certain issues not addressed in the Decree. One aspect of
Husband and Wife's verbal agreement required the parties to split
equally the cost of all of their children's non-school
extracurricular activities. A second aspect of the verbal
agreement was that Husband would pay Wife's income taxes that
were "above and beyond $1200 per month." Both parties complied
with the Decree and their oral agreement until 2004, when,
according to Wife, Husband failed to pay for the children's
extracurricular activities and for Wife's taxes.
1[4
In March 2005, Wife filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause
and a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, both of which alleged
that Husband had failed to comply with various obligations under
the Decree, including his obligation to pay increased child
support upon the termination of alimony. In response, Husband
filed an Answer and Counter Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Wife's counsel stated
that the parties had reached a "partial resolution and
stipulation" whereby Husband and Wife would "exchange their tax
returns for the years 2002, 2003, [and] 2004." Based on this
stipulation, the parties agreed to reserve the issue of
increasing Husband's monthly child support obligations for a
future hearing.
%S
Approximately one year later, Wife filed a Motion to Compel,
which alleged that Husband had failed to respond to a request for
the production of documents. Specifically, the motion sought
production of Husband's tax records. In an order dated June 2,
2006, the trial court denied Wife's Motion to Compel without
prejudice. In its order, the court noted that Husband's
"response to the document request did not provide all documents
requested, but set forth explanations as to why certain documents
were withheld."
%6
Wife then obtained new counsel and filed a second Motion for
Order to Show Cause, which alleged that Husband had failed to pay
for the children's extracurricular activities, to comply with
discovery requests, and to pay increased child support. At the
Order to Show Cause hearing, Wife's counsel clarified that
Husband had produced some of the requested tax records, but
alleged that Husband had failed to produce the "critical
document" showing Husband's "gross receipts or gross revenues"
for 2002 through 2004. The trial court also asked why Wife had
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previously failed to enforce Husband's obligation to pay for
extracurricular activities, to which Wife's counsel replied that
Wife's view was, "'I'm not going to be able to get it out of him,
so why should I try.'" Finally, after listening to Husband's
arguments on the Motion for Order to Show Cause, the trial court
stayed the proceedings and set a trial for the parties' petitions
to modify. The court also ordered Husband to produce his tax
records prior to trial.
1(7
During trial, Wife's counsel asked Husband whether he had
sent an email to Wife that stated, "'If you are successful in
raising child support, the children will suffer.'" Husband
denied making such a statement, and then Wife's counsel had
Husband read from a letter written by Husband, which contained
the above statement. Husband's counsel objected to the admission
of the letter on the grounds that it contained privileged
settlement negotiations. Ultimately, the trial court admitted
the letter with all but two sentences redacted.
1[8
Upon the completion of trial, the trial court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court determined
that Husband had not complied with several provisions of the
Decree. First, the court found that Husband had failed to pay
for the children's extracurricular activities as required by
paragraph ten of the Decree. Second, the court found that
Husband did not provide Wife with "a reasonable annual 'cost of
living' increase in alimony" as required by paragraph twenty of
the Decree. Third, the court determined that Husband failed to
provide his tax records to Wife as required by paragraph nine of
the Decree. Further, the trial court made a specific finding,
based on the parties' testimony, that Wife was credible but
Husband was not. In addition, the court found that although Wife
did not bring her enforcement action before the trial court for
"a long period of time," such delay was reasonable because Wife
had attempted to enforce the Decree several times without
success.
f9
Because of Husband's noncompliance with multiple provisions
of the Decree, the trial court held Husband in contempt of court
and awarded judgment to Wife in the amount of $44,311. In
addition, the trial court awarded Wife $7652.97 in attorney fees
based on the court's finding that "attorney fees are justified
and necessary and reasonable."
HlO

Husband appeals.
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Kll Husband asserts that the trial court erred by finding him in
contempt for his alleged failure to comply with the Decree. "The
decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless the trial court's action 'is so unreasonable as to
be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^ 8, 973 P.2d 988
(quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah
197 6)). In a related argument, Husband claims that the trial
court erred by "disregard[ing] the stipulation of the parties and
the law of the case . . . in finding [Husband] in contempt." We
likewise review this contention for an abuse of discretion. See
id.
Ul2 Second, Husband argues that the trial court exceeded its
discretion by admitting a portion of a letter that contained
statements made during settlement negotiations. "In reviewing
the admissibility of evidence at trial, we give deference to the
trial court's advantageous position, and do not overturn the
result unless it is clear the trial court erred." Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Hl3 Next, Husband claims that Wife should be equitably estopped
from receiving past alimony and child support and that Wife
waived any right she had to enforce such payments. "The
application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable
estopppel is a mixed question of fact and law." Trolley Square
Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) .
Consequently, we review questions of fact "under a deferential
clear error standard," but grant no deference to questions of
law. Terry v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App 87, H 8, 157 P.3d 362
(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, "'whether the
trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and
should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give a
[trial] court deference.'" Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v.
BriteSmile Mcrmt. , Inc. , 2005 UT App 381, K 20, 122 P. 3d 654
(quoting Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 16, 982 P.2d 572).
^[14 Husband also challenges the trial court's award of attorney
fees to Wife. "[A] trial court must base its award of attorney
fees on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the
payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees. The decision to award attorney fees must be
based on sufficient findings regarding these factors." Riley v.
Riley, 2006 UT App 214, fl 25, 138 P.3d 84 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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fl5 Finally, Wife asserts that she should be awarded her
attorney fees on appeal. "'Generally, when fees in a divorce
case are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court, and
that party in turn prevails on appeal, then fees will also be
awarded on appeal.'" Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44,
U 20, 19 P.3d 1005 (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508,
517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
ANALYSIS
I.

Contempt of Court

fl6 Husband's first argument is that the trial court erred by
finding him in contempt of court. "Under Utah law, 'in order to
prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must
be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was
required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or
refused to do so.'" Homeyer v. Stagg & Assocs., 2006 UT App 89,
<| 6, 132 P.3d 684 (quoting Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1172 (Utah 1988)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (2002). The
trial court ruled that "[Husband] knew there was an order of the
Court and had the ability and capacity to comply with the orders
of the Court" and that "[Husband] intentionally chose not to
follow the orders of the Court." As such, the trial court found
Husband in contempt for failing to follow paragraphs nine, ten,
and twenty of the Decree.
fl7 On appeal, Husband claims that he should not be held in
contempt because he "paid all child support and spousal support
as worked out by the parties" and because he complied with the
parties' stipulation on production of tax records. In other
words, Husband contends that he did not intentionally fail or
refuse to comply with the Decree. See Homeyer, 2 006 UT App 89,
f 6. We disagree.1
A.

Production of Documents

^18 Both parties admit that they stipulated to exchange their
tax records for 2002 through 2004. However, at the hearing on
the second Order to Show Cause, Wife's counsel stated that
1. Indeed, "[s]o long as [a divorce] decree stands, it is
incumbent upon [the parties] to comply with it, or at least to
exercise every reasonable effort to comply with it. If because
of change in the circumstances of the parties it appears that the
decree is inequitable, or impossible to comply with, [a party]
may petition for modification." Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216,
198 P.2d 233, 236 (1948).
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Husband had produced some documents, but alleged that Husband
failed to produce the "critical document11 showing Husband's
"gross receipts or gross revenues" for 2002 through 2004.
Furthermore, according to Wife, she did not receive these
"critical" tax records until six days before trial. The trial
court found Husband's testimony that he fully complied with the
requirement that he produce tax records incredible. We defer to
the trial court's unique position to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (deferring to the trial court's "superior
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh
the evidence").
B.

Child Support and Alimony Payments

fl9 Husband also contends that he made all alimony and child
support payments required by the Decree and the parties' oral
agreement. After considering all the evidence, the trial court
expressly found that Husband had failed to pay $31,997 in child
support as required by paragraph nine of the Decree and violated
paragraph ten of the Decree by failing to pay for $1726 worth of
the children's non-school extracurricular activities. The trial
court was in the best position to consider the conflicting
evidence on this point, and we defer to its findings.
f20 The trial court also ruled that Husband had failed to pay
$3 8 08 in cost of living spousal support, as required by paragraph
twenty of the Decree. Husband has not specifically challenged
this finding on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court's
finding of Husband in contempt of court for his violation of
paragraph twenty of the Decree. See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, f 74, 100 P.3d 1177 (affirming because appellant failed to
adequately challenge trial court's findings of fact by marshaling
the evidence).
\2\
In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial
court's action in finding Husband in contempt for failing to
produce his tax records and failing to comply with his child
support and alimony obligations "'is so unreasonable as to be
classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, \ 8, 973 P.2d 988
(quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah
1976)) . We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to hold
Husband in contempt of court based on his failure to produce tax
records and to pay alimony and child support.
C.

Additional Arguments

^[22 In a related claim, Husband asserts that the trial court
should not have found him in contempt because such a ruling
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"disregard[ed] the stipulation of the parties and the law of the
case." These arguments are without merit. As noted above,
Husband failed to make all of his child support and alimony
obligations and did not fully comply with the stipulation to
exchange tax records. Indeed, Husband did not produce the most
relevant tax records until six days prior to trial.
^23 Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable
here. "The 'law of the case1 doctrine specifies that when a
legal 'decision [is] made on an issue during one stage of a
case,1 that decision 'is binding in successive stages of the same
litigation.1" Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1 67, 82
P. 3d 1076 (alteration in original) (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder
County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995)). However, there are
exceptions to the doctrine: "(1) when there has been an
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new
evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced
that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75,
U 9, 31 P.3d 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). More
importantly, "the law of the case doctrine does not prevent a
judge from reconsidering his or her previous nonfinal orders."
Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, *h 29, 24 P.3d
984.
K24 In an attempt to apply the law of the case doctrine here,
Husband asserts that the trial court's order holding him in
contempt is inconsistent with its prior rulings. We agree that
the trial court accepted the parties' stipulation and later
denied, without prejudice, Wife's motion to compel production of
Husband's tax records. However, Wife later filed a new motion in
response to Husband's continued failure to produce the documents.
During the hearing on the second Order to Show Cause, Wife's
counsel explained that Husband had failed to produce the
"critical documents" showing his tax information. As a result,
the trial court revisited its prior ruling and required Husband
to produce his tax records prior to trial. Thus, any change to
the court's prior ruling was brought about by Husband's
noncompliance, and was well within the trial court's discretion.
See id. (noting that trial court may reconsider its prior
nonfinal rulings). We therefore affirm the trial court's order
finding Husband in contempt of court.
II.

Admission of the Settlement Letter

^[25 Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred by admitting
statements in a letter authored by Husband, which Husband sent to
Wife in the context of settlement negotiations. Husband further
contends that the trial court should not have relied on these
statements in making its determination that Husband's testimony
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lacked credibility. In response, Wife argues that the statements
in the letter were properly admitted because such statements were
used to impeach Husband's prior testimony. We review the trial
court's determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Davidson v. Prince,
813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We affirm because even
if the trial court erred by admitting Husband's statements, such
error was harmless.
^2 6 Husband has the burden of proving not only that the trial
court erred, but that such error "was substantial and prejudicial
in that [Husband] was deprived in some manner of a full and fair
consideration of the disputed issues by the [finder of fact]."
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). We therefore
must first determine whether the trial court erred by admitting
the settlement letter.
1(27 During trial, Wife's counsel asked Husband whether he
admitted sending Wife an email stating that "the children will
suffer" if Wife succeeded in raising child support. Husband
responded that he had not sent such an email. Wife's counsel
then had Husband read from a letter written by Husband, which
stated, "If successful in raising child support, ultimately, the
children will suffer." Prior to entering the letter into
evidence, Wife's counsel informed the court that the letter
contained "some settlement discussions" and offered to redact
portions of the letter. Husband's counsel then objected to the
admission of the letter, arguing that all of its contents were
inadmissible as communications made during settlement
negotiations. After a colloquy on the issue, the trial court
instructed counsel to redact all statements relating to the
settlement negotiations. The letter was then admitted with all
but two sentences redacted.2
^28 In order for statements made during settlement negotiations
to be excluded from the evidence, "the party seeking to have
evidence of offers to compromise or statements made in the course
thereof excluded must show that the discussions in question were
made in compromise negotiations." Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1232
(internal quotation marks omitted). Husband argues that the
entire letter contained settlement negotiations. More
specifically, Husband states that the phrase "[i] f successful in
raising child support, ultimately the children will suffer" was
made in response to a specific settlement amount offered by Wife
2. The admitted portions of the letter read: "If successful in
raising child support, ultimately the children will suffer. I
will no longer provide the additional help that I have in the
past."
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and was meant to demonstrate that Wife's offer was unacceptable.
In response, Wife argues that statements made in settlement
negotiations can be admitted for impeachment.
1J2 9 Under rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, u[e]vidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is . . .
not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 408. Rule 408, however, "does
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness . . . ." Id. Thus, although generally
statements made during settlement negotiations are inadmissible
under rule 408, there are exceptions, one of which allows for the
admission of statements made during settlement negotiations if
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice.3
^[3 0 As Wife points out, a footnote in our prior case law
suggests impeachment as one permissible use of statements made in
settlement negotiations. In Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), we stated that "evidence of statements made
in settlement negotiations can and should be admitted for
purposes of impeachment." Id. at 1233 n.9. Because the Davidson
court held that the demand at issue was not made in the course of
settlement negotiations, see id. at 1233, its footnote regarding
the impeachment exception to rule 40 8 is dictum. This statement
reflected a then-existing trend among courts interpreting rule
408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar state rules.
See id. at 1233 n.9 (discussing several cases in which statements
made in settlement negotiations were admitted for purposes of
impeachment). This tendency to admit settlement negotiations for
impeachment received much criticism. See EEOC v. Gear Petroleum,
Inc., 948 F.2d 1542, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) (" [T]he Court should
decide against admitting statements made during settlement
negotiations as impeachment evidence when they are used to
impeach a party who tried to settle a case but failed. The
3. We note, however, that for statements from settlement
negotiations to be admissible "for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness," Utah R. Evid. 408, the
negotiations must still be relevant. See R. Collin Mangrum & Dee
Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 183 (2006-07 ed.)
(noting that a party seeking to admit evidence over a rule 408
objection must show that the evidence is relevant). Indeed,
under rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, any relevant
evidence, including impeachment evidence under rule 4 08, "may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403; see also id.
R. 401 (defining "relevant evidence").

20070176-CA

9

philosophy of [rule 4 08 of the Federal Rules of Evidence] is to
allow the parties to drop their guard and to talk freely and
loosely without fear that a concession made to advance
negotiations will be used at trial. Opening the door to
impeachment evidence on a regular basis may well result in more
restricted negotiations." (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-131
n.269 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that Davidson "effectively
nullifies" rule 408 because "the jury is not likely to make much
of the distinction between admission to impeach and admission as
substantive evidence").
H31 In 2006, rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was
amended to state that evidence of settlement negotiations is not
admissible "to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or
contradiction."4 Fed. R. Evid. 408. This amendment was in
response to the division among the courts over whether settlement
negotiations can be admitted for impeachment. See Fed. R. Evid.
408 Advisory Committee Notes: 2006 Amendment, 28 U.S.C.A. (West
Supp. 2007) (noting that 2006 amendments were meant to "settle
some questions in the courts about the scope of the Rule").
According to the Advisory Committee Notes, "[t]he amendment
prohibits the use of statements made in settlement negotiations
when offered to impeach by prior inconsistent statement or
through contradiction. Such broad impeachment would tend to
swallow the exclusionary rule and would impair the public policy
of promoting settlements." Id. Thus, Federal rule 408 now
explicitly prohibits the use of evidence of settlement
negotiations for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement or
contradiction.
1J32 Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence has not been amended
to include an express prohibition on the use of evidence of
settlement negotiations for impeachment of prior inconsistent
statements. We recognize, however, the persuasive rationale
behind the current trend among courts to exclude evidence of
settlement negotiations even for purposes of impeachment.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by admitting the
4. "When . . . there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah
rule and the Utah and federal rules are identical, we freely
resort to federal law as a useful guide." Oakwood Vill. LLC v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f 12 n.l, 104 P.3d 1226 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the current version of rule
408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is no longer identical to
rule 4 08 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we nonetheless discuss
the federal rule as indicative of the current trend regarding the
admissibility of evidence of settlement negotiations for
impeachment purposes.
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statements from Husband's settlement letter. Consequently/ to
the extent that our dicta in Davidson suggests that evidence of
settlement negotiations are admissible for purposes of
impeachment, we now depart from that non-binding precedent. See
Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, % 28, 154 P.3d 808 (noting that
dicta is not binding on appellate court)^[33 Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court on the ground that
even if it did err by admitting Husband's statements during
settlement negotiations, such error was harmless. In order to
prove prejudice, Husband must show that the trial court's error
"was substantial and prejudicial in that [Husband] was deprived
in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed
issues by the [finder of fact]." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,
154 (Utah 1987); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61 ("No error in either
the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.").
f34 Husband argues that the error was prejudicial because the
trial court based its determination that he was incredible in
part on the impeachment evidence. At trial, however, the court
stated that its finding regarding Husband's credibility was also
based on Husband's statement that "he was following all of the
different measures inside of the . . . divorce decree, despite
the fact that he admitted that in fact he was behind on a couple
of them." The trial court also found Husband's claim that he
misinterpreted the requirements of the Decree to be "unreasonable
and quite frankly, incredible." Thus, the trial court's finding
that Husband was not believable was based on at least two grounds
unrelated to the impeachment evidence. We therefore conclude
that the admission of the evidence of settlement negotiations did
not prejudice Husband, and affirm the trial court.
III.

Equitable Estoppel and Waiver

^3 5 Husband asserts that Wife should be equitably estopped from
claiming unpaid alimony and child support because she failed to
enforce the Decree for several years and because she accepted
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payments not required by the Decree.5 There are three elements
that must be met to succeed on a claim of equitable estoppel:
first, a statement, admission, act, or
failure to act by one party inconsistent with
a claim later asserted; next, reasonable
action or inaction by the other party taken
or not taken on the basis of the first
party's statement, admission, act or failure
to act; and, third, injury to the second
party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Youncrblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, <fl 14, 158 P.3d
1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, Husband
claims that Wife's failure to enforce the Decree and acceptance
of certain payments reasonably led him to comply only partially
with the Decree, and that it would be inequitable to require
Husband to pay the full amount of unpaid alimony and child
support at this late date.
^|3 6 In response, Wife argues that estoppel is inappropriate
because her actions demonstrated a desire to enforce fully the
Decree. We agree. At trial, Wife testified that " [f ] or the
first few years" after the parties' divorce, she frequently
requested to exchange tax documents and go over expense receipts
with Husband. Further, Wife testified that she felt that Husband
would never give her the proper documentation and that the only
way to enforce the Decree fully would be through litigation.
Again, the trial court expressly found that Wife's testimony was
credible, which finding we defer to on appellate review. See
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(deferring to the trial court's "superior position to judge the

5. Wife contends that Husband failed to preserve his estoppel
argument for appeal. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164
P.3d 366 ("Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Our review of the record,
however, reveals that Husband specifically argued the issue of
estoppel in the second Motion on the Order to Show Cause and
during the trial. We therefore address the merits of Husband's
estoppel claim.
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credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence").
therefore reject Husband's equitable estoppel claim.6

We

^[37 In a similar vein, Husband argues that "[Wife's] actions in
not pursuing recovery of past support and acceptance of payments
not required by [the Decree] constitute a waiver" of her right to
enforce the Decree. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an
existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. [The
relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although it may be
express or implied." Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, % 29, 71 P.3d
589 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
H38 Wife again claims that Husband failed to preserve this issue
for appeal. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 P.3d 366
(discussing necessity of preserving issues for appeal). We
agree. Because Husband raises his waiver argument for the first
time on appeal, and has failed to cite where in the record his
argument is preserved, we refuse to address the merits of this
claim. See, e.g., Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT
30, f 10 n.2, 116 P.3d 295 ("With limited exceptions, the
practice of this court has been to decline consideration of
issues raised for the first time on appeal." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
IV.

Attorney Fees

t39 Husband challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees
to Wife. Husband's primary argument is that attorney fees were
improper because the trial court should not have found him in
contempt of court. Given our disposition of Husband's challenge
to the contempt finding, we must reject this argument. Husband
also alleges, however, that the trial court did not enter
6. We note also that "'[t]he right to support from the parents
belongs to the minor children and is not subject to being
bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by
the agreement or conduct of the parents. 1 " Andrus v. Andrus,
2007 UT App 291, f 14, 169 P.3d 754 (quoting Hills v. Hills, 638
P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981)); but see Department of Human Servs. ex
rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997) (holding
that mother may, by her actions or representations, be precluded
from recovering past due installments of support money to
reimburse her for child rearing expenses she incurred before
father's paternity was established). Thus, even if Husband were
to succeed on his estoppel claim, Wife's actions could not
curtail the right of the children to receive future child support
from Husband.
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sufficient findings on the reasonableness of Wife's attorney fees
or Wife's need for such fees. We agree.
f40 Under Utah Code section 30-3-3, a trial court "may order a
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees . . . of
the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend
the action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (2007). "In doing so,
however, the trial court must base its award of attorney fees 'on
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor
spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees.'" Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, fl 25, 138 P.3d 84
(quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App.
1998)). Further, "[t]he decision to award attorney fees 'must be
based on sufficient findings regarding these factors.'" Id.
(quoting Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 18, 19 P.3d
1005) .
f41 Here, the trial court awarded Wife $7652 in attorney fees.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
concluded that attorney fees were "justified and necessary and
reasonable." The court also instructed Wife's counsel to
"prepare an affidavit of attorney fees incurred by [Wife]."
Because the trial court did not set forth findings of fact to
support this conclusion, there is no evidence in the court's
order "of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor
spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees," id. U 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, we agree with Husband and hold that the trial court
failed to make the findings of fact needed to support an award of
attorney fees to Wife.
1f4 2 "'The trial court . . . must make the findings of fact
explicit in support of its legal conclusions . . . .
Without
adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate
review.'" Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 18 (omissions in
original) (quoting Willey v. Willey, 951 P. 2d 226, 230 (Utah
1997)). Furthermore, "'unless the record clearly and
uncontrovertedly supports the trial court's decision, the absence
of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more
detailed findings by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Woodward v.
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
^[43 Finally, Wife urges this court to award her attorney fees on
appeal. "[W]hen fees in a divorce case are awarded to the
prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn
prevails on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on appeal."
Id. f 2 0 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously
held, however, that
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[b]ecause the trial court did not make
sufficient findings to support the award of
attorney fees to [the receiving spouse], we
cannot determine if she should be awarded
fees on appeal. However, if the trial court
determines it can make sufficient findings on
each of the factors required to support the
award then [the receiving spouse] should also
receive her reasonable fees on appeal.
Id. We therefore deny Wife's request for attorney fees on appeal
at this time, but if the trial court determines that it can enter
sufficient findings of fact to support such an award, the court
may also grant Wife her attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
^[44 The trial court properly held Husband in contempt of court
for his intentional violation of the Decree. Although the court
exceeded its discretion by admitting Husband's statements from
the settlement letter, the error was harmless because such
statements were merely cumulative of other reasons the trial
court found Husband's testimony incredible. We also hold that
Wife is not estopped from enforcing the Decree and that Husband
did not preserve his waiver argument. We reverse the trial
court1s award of attorney fees to Wife and remand for the entry
of sufficient findings of fact.
^[4 5 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings in part.
I, the undersigned. Clerk of the Utah Court of
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